It is perhaps convenient for us as Americans to believe that our struggle for independence in the latter half of the 18th century was solely due to the efforts of like-minded volunteer militia and well-heeled gentry of the original 13 colonies. The legends of men like Paul Revere and Daniel Morgan have rolled down to us as examples of independent-minded, patriotic heroes standing toe-to-toe with the world’s greatest superpower. But while it can be said without a doubt that the victory of independence was largely due to the collective decisions and actions of the militias, regular army, and representative leadership, it is an incomplete picture. Given recent political antagonisms it might be unpopular to advance this point; however, it would be wrong to forget the contributions- economic, strategic, and physical- that the French made towards our victory. In fact, the French played a critical, if not the critical role in helping push George III’s court to accepting terms of independence. As is typical within historical circumstances, this story is best told within the confines of a single person’s experience. In this case, the story of Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roche Gilbert du Motier, the legendary Marquis de Lafayette.
You can find his name in every major American city- street names, national and state parks, public buildings, statues, and even city names themselves. The greatest of foreign-born soldiers in the Continental Army was a man George Washington himself held in the very highest esteem. 50 years after the founding of the United States, Lafayette made a return tour of the country for which he gave so much as a youth. He was met with throngs of adoring Americans wherever he traveled. Crowds cried out his name and even fought just to get a glimpse of a man that they felt was a hero of their recent Revolution. Yet most Americans have no idea who this man was, let alone the enormous contribution he made to our country’s fight for independence.Whether the Colonies would have had the necessary strength to implement the Declaration of Independence, let alone win the War, without the aid of France is a question we do not seriously consider in modern-day history classes. Certainly the leaders of the Continental Congress realized the importance of French assistance and began to seek out such help soon after the outbreak of the American Revolution. In the fall of 1775, the Congress appointed a Secret Committee of Foreign Correspondence. Early the next year the committee decided to send an agent to France to seek the aid of that Nation in the struggle against Great Britain. Silas Deane was selected for the task. Within a few months after his arrival in France, Deane, covertly aided by the French Government, obtained and sent to America clothing and arms in large quantities. At the suggestion of Deane, the Compte de Vergennes, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, obtained permission to lend America money. Until 1778, France continued to give America all aid short of actual military support. Lafayette had heard about, and became sympathetic towards, the romantic American cause, which to him represented an opportunity not only to distinguish himself, but also to pursue what he deemed a truly noble cause. He made the passage to America, after seeking and gaining assurances by the American ambassador, Silas Deane, that he would receive a commission as major generals in the Continental Army. He arrived in Charleston, South Carolina, in June, 1777, and traveled to Philadelphia to meet with members of Congress who welcomed him enthusiastically as he announced that he would serve without pay as a volunteer. In August he met General Washington and a friendship developed between the two men which lasted throughout the remainder of Washington’s life. He spent the winter of 1777 at Valley Forge with the rest of the army. It was there that Lafayette first demonstrated his value to the army in general, and to Washington in particular. It was at Valley Forge where several of Washington’s subordinate officers conspired against Washington to have Congress relieve him of overall command. However, they were unable to gain the support they expected. They tried to secure the cooperation of Lafayette, as well as Alexander Hamilton, but both men declined. Washington found Lafayette to be not only a loyal officer, but a devoted friend as well.
Washington’s confidence in the young Frenchmen was proven correct at the Battle of Monmouth. The command of the force entrusted with the attack against the British general Clinton was assigned to Charles Lee, Lee having the highest officer rank next to Washington himself. Lafayette commanded one of Lee’s divisions. Monmouth is famous for the high degree of disorder during the American’s retreat from the field (Lee was later chastised strongly by Washington for his unwillingness to engage the enemy). It was Lafayette who sent a messenger to Washington urging him to come to the filed himself. During the remainder of the battle, Lafayette commanded the second line of infantry. In early 1778 Washington sent General John Sullivan to Newport, Rhode Island, where the British had fortified a strong defensive position. Sullivan was to later combine his forces with supporting troops from Nathaneal Greene Lafayette, as well as a highly anticipated French force. The Americans hoped that the French forces would provide the badly needed strategic tipping point required to defeat the British. Unfortunately the French fleet suffered serious damages during the voyage to Newport, and retired to Boston for repairs. Lafayette was ordered to Boston to urge the French to get back underway as soon as possible. Traveling back to Newport, with little rest, Lafayette found that the British had taken the initiative and attacked Sullivan’s forces, and the Americans were retreating to higher ground. Lafayette immediately went to Sullivan and requested that he be given command of Sullivan’s reserve forces. Sullivan agreed, and Lafayette brought the reserve forces to the front lines to combine with the main force, which subsequently forced the British to withdraw. In his subsequent report to Congress, Sullivan noted Lafayette’s skills, whereupon on September 9, 1778, Congress passed a resolve formally thanking Lafayette for his commitment to the Revolutionary cause. Soon thereafter, Lafayette returned to France where he received accolades from the French court for his devotion to the American cause.
But Lafayette’s service to America was just beginning. Lafayette made numerous formal and informal efforts to secure additional aid from his government for the colonists. In June of 1779 Lafayette wrote Washington and expressed his desire to back with the army again. In 1780 Lafayette’s efforts (among others, to be sure) resulted in the deployment of French troops and supplies to America. So insistent was Lafayette for aid to the Americans that one day the Minister of Finance said in the royal council: “It is fortunate for the King, that Lafayette does not take it into his head to strip Versailles of its furniture, to send to his dear Americans; as his Majesty would be unable to refuse it.” The King appointed Jean-Baptiste-Donatien de Vimeur, the Count de Rochambeau, as overall commander of the force’s twelve battalions of infantry, with Lafayette to take command of the American division serving directly under Washington’s command.
Upon their arrival, Washington deployed Lafayette to the southern states to help thwart Lord Cornwallis’ movements. By autumn of 1781 Cornwallis and his troops were penned into Yorktown, Virginia, where his position was made precarious by the arrival of a large French battle fleet. After a long siege of the British positions, Cornwallis was compelled to surrender on October 19, 1781. After the British surrender, Lafayette again asked for permission to return to his native France. Before he sailed Washington wrote Lafayette: “I owe it to your friendship and to my affectionate regard for you, my dear Marquis, not to let you leave this country without carrying with you fresh marks of my attachment to you, and new expressions of the high sense I entertain of your military conduct and other important services in the course of the last campaign, although the latter are too well known to need the testimony of my approbation.” Lafayette sailed for France on December 23, 1781, but before sailing he wrote Washington an affectionate reply: “Adieu, my dear General; I know your heart so well that I am sure that no distance can alter your attachment to me. With the same candor I assure that my love, respect, my gratitude for you, are above expression; that, at the moment of leaving you, I felt more than ever the strength of those friendly ties that forever bind me to you.”
Upon his return to France, Lafayette was hailed as a hero on both sides of the Atlantic. In 1782, he was promoted to the rank of marechal-de-camp (major general) in the French Army by Louis XVI. During the following 20 years, he aided the American government on numerous Franco-American political and economic issues. He also threw himself completely behind the questions of reform in his homeland. He was one of the first Frenchmen to advocate a National Assembly, and supported the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. He favored many radical positions for France such as the abolishment of formal titles, instituting trial by jury, religious freedom, and political rights for blacks. By the late 1780′s, Lafayette became one of the most popular and powerful men in France. On the first anniversary of the capture of the Bastille, Lafayette himself administered the oath of loyalty to “the nation, the law, and the king” to a large assembly of troops and sailors. But, being a fierce independent thinker, eventually he was attacked by both sides of the French political spectrum. Lafayette himself rescued Queen Marie Antoinette from the mob that stormed the Palace of Versailles on October 5, 1789.
In 1790 Lafayette was promoted to Lieutenant General in the French army, but resigned shortly thereafter. When war against Britain broke out in 1792, he prepared troops for war, winning the confidence of his men by, among other things, organizing mounted artillery. Against his wishes, he was ordered to move his troops to what is now Belgium even though they were not prepared. As Jacobin radicalists gained favor in Paris, he was unable to help his king and queen and bring his troops home to deal with the mobs now roaming Paris, and was summarily declared a traitor. He fled to Belgium with members of his immediate staff, but was arrested by the Austrians, who in turn surrendered him to the Prussians. For five years he remained in jail, despite English and American political pressure aimed at his release. Finally the Austrians turned him over to the U.S. consul in Hamburg. He returned to Paris in 1800, his family fortune all but gone. He then turned his attentions to La Grange, his home just outside of Paris, where he apparently settled into a quiet agrarian life, the only major interruption being his refusing allegiance to Bonaparte himself during a visit Napoleon made to Lafayette’s home.
In 1818, after three years of seclusion at home, he was elected to the chamber of deputies, where he sat till 1824, as a leader of the opposition, opposing the censorship of the press, and voting for various liberal measures. In 1824 President Monroe invited Lafayette to visit the United States. He arrived in New York, and was warmly greeted by virtually everyone he met. In the course of the next fourteen months he traveled through the whole country, visiting each of the 24 states and all the main cities. In consideration of his services in the Revolutionary war, Congress voted him a grant of $200,000, and a Florida township of 24,000 acres. His sixty-eighth birthday (September 6th, 1825) was celebrated at the White House with then President John Quincy Adams. He was the last surviving major general of the War of Independence.
Returning once again to France, Lafayette was retired until, at 73, he led an opposition movement to new restrictions on citizens’ rights. In 1830 he took part in his third revolution- he was offered command of the Army of National Guards that drove Charles X from France, but declined the popular demand that he be named president of a new republic. Instead, he supported the ascension of Louis Philippe to the throne. He remained a member of the chamber of deputies until his death. It is interesting to note that Lafayette was truly unique among his French political peers; he refused to cooperate with the Bourbons, the Jacobins or with Bonaparte himself; and all three sides tried to discredit him for many years. Yet his support from the populace, although inconsistent at times, remained substantial throughout his adult life. Lafayette died in Paris on May 20, 1834. When news of his death reached America, Congress ordered the Liberty Bell muffled. He received a huge state funeral, and his remains were interred beside those of his wife in the cemetery of Picpus in Saint-Antoine. He left one son, George Washington, and two daughters.
Lafayette left a journal, which was published along with various ancillary materials (including letters to and from Washington) by his son George under the title “Memoires, manuscrits et correspondance du General de Lafayette ” (6 volumes, 1837-’38).
See also Lafayette by Harlow Giles Unger; The New Cambridge Modern History: Volume 8, The American and French Revolutions 1763-93 (The New Cambridge Modern History by A. Goodwin; General and Madame de Lafayette: Partners in Liberty’s Cause in the American and French Revolutions by Jason Lane.
March 28th, 2007
Believed by many military historians to have been the greatest general ever to have lived, there is precious little information about the man the Romans called “The Mad Carthaginian.” Why? Because Hannibal and his small yet devoted army instilled so much fear in the Roman Empire that Rome decreed all references to Hannibal be “purged from memory, lest others be inspired.” Still, his name and campaigns against Rome remain legendary, bordering on mythical. A brief look at the life and times of Hannibal.In the centuries following Hannibal’s death, a phrase became part of the vernacular of Roman life- “Hannibal at the gates!” Mothers would scold misbehaving children with this warning, echoing the words that Romans called out in the streets amid Hannibal’s anticipated and even rumored advances upon Rome during the Second Punic War. The phrase itself can be traced to the very real sense of terror that permeated the Italian peninsula more than 2,200 years ago. Today, casual references to Hannibal are usually associated with barbarism or perhaps an expedition across the Pyrenees via elephant. Yet to early Romans his name struck the hearts and minds of soldiers and civilians alike with panic and fear. So who was Hannibal of Carthage really, and how did he reduce the great Roman Empire to such a state, even if only for a brief time?
Hannibal was born to a Carthaginian general named Hamilcar Barca around 227 B.C. Hamilcar was a well-respected warrior, whose army included conscripts and mercenaries from many different cultures, countries and backgrounds. As the eldest son of their leader, the young Hannibal would have been able to move freely among the fires of his father’s mountain encampments on the southern Mediterranean seashore near modern Tunis in Tunisia. He would have seen the strange clothing of Africans and Iberian horseman, and heard the languages of Greeks, Egyptians, Roman deserters, and even Mongols and Indians. His father was respected by this diverse collection of soldiers for many reasons, not least of which because he demonstrated tolerance and respect for the many different cultures and customs that made up his army. In turn, their respect for him was evident in Hamilcar’s ability to hold out against Roman siege for so long as Roman influence spread throughout the eastern Mediterranean during Hannibal’s youth. When Rome finally relented, Hamilcar was given free passage with his family, soldiers, and slaves back to Carthage. This concluded the First Punic War, a victory for Rome, whereupon Rome stripped Carthage of Sicily and then took Sardinia and Corsica as well.
After this passage, Hamilcar enjoined Hannibal and his brothers in a blood oath, making them swear to never yield against Rome, and to never give up the struggle. It undoubtedly left a deep impression on Hannibal, as this conviction consumed most of his adult life.
Hannibal’s Mediterranean World
Before the Second Punic War, you could divide the Mediterranean roughly in two, not only geographically but practically. The world west of where southern Italy and Sicily served to demarcate Rome’s influence has been treated by some historians as the “edge of the civilized world” at that point in time. However the Carthaginian’s forebears, the Phoenicians, had mastered the waters of the western Mediterranean and were routinely exploring and forming commercial ties all up and down the waters of the European and African coastline as north as modern Britain and as far south as the Ivory Coast and beyond. Carthaginian merchants and explorers brought great wealth to Carthage. According to the Greek geographer Strabo, Carthage once ruled more than 300 cities in Libya and up to 700,000 people in Carthage alone.
Iberia (modern Spain) was key to the western Mediterranean region, and that is precisely where Hamilcar took Hannibal and the rest of his family in 237 B.C. There were already several Carthaginian cities in the region of Andalusia- Gader, Malkah, and New Carthage (Cartagena). Rome continued to exert strong pressure (military and political) on the Carthaginians to relinquish more and more control to the Empire. In 221, Hannibal took command of the Carthaginian army in Spain. In 220 he captured Salamanca. In 219 he took Saguntum, a Roman ally.
The personal magnetism and leadership qualities of Hannibal simply cannot be overestimated. He quickly formed strong alliances and gained respect among the various tribal leaders and peoples of his adopted home. He learned the local language and dialects, and even married an Iberian princess. His life became a single measure of purpose: total independence from Rome’s influence. And he surely understood that given the times and Rome’s spreading power, the only path was war: to take the battle to the Romans before it came to them. What is interesting to note is that while he was establishing control over Spain and pursuing this “conquer or be conquered” strategy, Hannibal effectively sparked the first real “World War” which would be fought in Spain, southern France, Italy, and northern Africa.
The Second Punic War
In 218 he moved to establish complete control over the entire Iberian peninsula. As expected, Rome declared war (thus beginning the Second Punic War) and sent an army to Sicily, where they entirely expected Hannibal to organize and mount an attack by sea. But Hannibal was well aware of the absolute dominance which Rome held on the water. He had no intention of putting his entire force at risk before even having a chance to engage the legions in a land battle. So he envisioned and executed a brilliant and unorthodox plan by creating opportunity where none had existed before. He took his army of 50,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry and 37 war elephants on his fabled march over the Pyrenees, and into the Po Valley across the Rhone river, ferrying his elephants over the water on rafts. This march is significant because not only did it represent a brilliantly unorthodox military maneuver, but also because of the speed and discipline with which it was conducted (it took two weeks, and was completed in October, as the winter snows were beginning to fall). Less than 45,000 troops survived the crossing.
They encamped near modern Turin. Here they joined forces with several of the Gallic tribes of modern France, to whom he had made discreet overtures before his trip across the mountains. The Gauls were an extremely fierce and proud people, with long hair and huge mustaches. They disliked foreign rule of any kind, and were predisposed to Hannibal’s overtures of alliance. Here Hannibal advanced a theme that he would try to use time and time again during his attempts at enlisting the native peoples of Rome’s conquered territories: send the invaders back home. Whenever Hannibal would engage people such as the Gauls, he would try and form a kindred spirit by promoting the idea that Rome was their common enemy, and an alliance was not only beneficial but absolutely necessary to throw the foreigners back. Harold Lamb recounts one legendary episode in which Hannibal showed some Gallic leaders a stone tablet, upon which was written an edict which the Romans had made during their conquest. The tablet stated that the territory was subject to more or less martial law, subjecting the territory to the laws of a province, without the privileges of Roman citizenship (1). Whenever he moved into a new territory, or took in Roman deserters and/or prisoners, he often displayed mercy and generosity whenever possible or prudent to try and turn the countryside to his favor. Although this tactic proved unsuccessful late in the war, it proved to sway many tribal chiefs early in his campaigns.
The First Victory
In the summer of 218, the Romans moved an army against Hannibal just east of Turin. In the darkness before dawn of the second day of the battle, Hannibal sent African cavalry units to stir up the Roman encampment as part of a feinting maneuver, awakening the soldiers from their sleep. In the ensuing confusion and the threat of imminent attack by the Carthaginian army, the Romans rushed onto the field before they had breakfast. Many of the troops marched into formation or mounted their horses without even any water. They moved onto the plain, and waited. Hannibal positioned his weakest troops at the center, a highly unorthodox move, given that these soldiers would be expected to face the heart of the legion formations. Hannibal then placed his cavalry and expert archers at the perimeter. When the legions advanced, the perimeters essentially closed in and decimated the flanks of the Roman army. At the same time, Hannibal had placed an elite set of troops in reserve, hidden from view by a small hill beside the battlefield. Here was the first practical application of a strategy he had learned from his father – try and make the land itself work for you. When the now tired, hungry and thirsty Roman troops began to fall back, Hannibal gave the signal for his select units to attack. As the hidden troops suddenly rushed onto the field, an entire Roman legion disintegrated and went into full retreat.
With roughly 14,000 new Gaul recruits, the Carthaginian army won a second engagement at the Trebia river. Here another theme of Hannibal’s army became apparent. To even the lowliest conscript in his army, he promised some measurable gain upon victory. Whether it was tribute or spoils, land or actual silver payment, he promised and followed through on providing his army with some goal to strive for during their campaigns. As Lamb describes, Hannibal created a sense of enfranchisement among his troops; he needed them, and they fought for him.
Plutarch records that volunteerism within the Roman army swelled. More than 100 senators resigned their posts and joined the ranks of the legions. Lamb tells of Roman knights of all ages enlisting in cavalry units, and enlistment in infantry units from every station in life. There was strong political movement to promote leaders who favored the all-out mobilization of the people. One thought began to consume the populace- destroy the threat of Hannibal and the Carthaginians. A sleeping giant had awakened.
In the spring of 216 B.C. Hannibal moved south against Cannae on the Ofanto River in central Italy. In late summer Hannibal engaged the Roman legions in the now infamous Battle of Cannae, in which Hannibal again employed ingenious tactics to crush a numerically superior opponent. Hannibal employed what military historians call a “double-envelopment” maneuver. The Roman army numbered almost 80,000 men; Hannibal, had 35,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. Both armies advanced against each other. Hannibal’s forces overpowered the Roman cavalry on the right flank. Overwhelmed, the Roman horsemen dispersed. Hannibal then turned the Roman flank and moved against the Roman cavalry on the other wing. Pressed on both sides, the Romans were summarily crushed, as the Carthaginians turned against the rear of the Roman formations. T he Romans had pushed deep into the middle of the opposing infantry, but Hannibal’s Libyan infantry and cavalry held on all sides, enveloping and slaughtering the Roman ranks. What Roman ranks fled were literally hamstrung as Hannibal’s cavalry pursued, slashing at hamstrings, later returning to kill the immobilized men. 48,000 Romans were killed. Again, Hannibal showed clemency to non-Roman prisoners, sending them home. What survivors remained were executed or sold to Greek tradesman as slaves. Carthaginian losses were about 6,600 men.
It was the largest defeat in the short but prescient history of the Roman republic; it subsequently sent the Roman populace into what can only be described as a state of panic. Rome had lost not only an entire army, but all of the 100 senators who had volunteered. Fabius, the senior statesman and the early, lone voice for strong reaction to the threat to Rome, had cleverly called on Romans to engage in all manner of sacrificial and communal activities, declaring that the whole citizenry would need to spiritually “purge” the city. This rally served to distract the people from the real threat which was presently forming, and gave Fabius valuable time to organize.
To best appreciate the source and context of this fear, it is useful to understand a bit about Roman society at the time. Roman culture was such that discipline ruled much of everyday life and decisions. It was not uncommon for senior commanders to execute a son for disobeying orders. This discipline derived from a strong sense of self- a code of discipline in one’s everyday life. However, this code could, and did work against the Romans when things went badly. As Lamb describes, the highly organized and drilled Roman legions were a very impressive and effective fighting force. But when these ranks could be turned or broken, as at Cannae, the discipline soon worked into panic, as a sense of order was replaced by complete disorganization and chaos. And this sense of chaos, in turn, worked its way into the populace’s mind, as their sense of safety and order became threatened.
This fear proved to be as useful a mobilizer and motivator of the Roman will to conquer as anything imaginable.
Tarentum, a Roman provincial outpost, was able to briefly hold out against Hannibal’s army, but after a series of clandestine meetings between Hannibal and several leaders of the city in which they agreed to help the general take the city peacefully, the Carthaginians took command of the city on 212 B.C. Once again, Hannibal made it a point to spare all non-Roman inhabitants, slaughtering or selling off the surviving Roman soldiers and citizens. In 209 B.C. the Roman general Marcellus began a serious pursuit of Hannibal’s army, which had recently abandoned Tarantum. They met on a nearby plain, and over the course of several days the Romans succeeded in breaking the Carthaginians ranks, causing Hannibal to retreat under cover of darkness . Marcellus could not pursue because of the vast numbers of wounded in his camp.
On the Spanish front, the Roman general Nero, under command of the Consul Livius, chased and met the forces of Hasdrubal, Hannibal’s brother, at the Metaurus River, south of Arminum on the Adriatic Sea. Hasdrubal tried to escape with his army north over the Pyrenees, but became cornered and had to fight. With his army of 30,000, he tried to use the land as much to his advantage as possible, placing a contingent on his left flank against the river Metaurus where it was too deep to cross. He placed his Gauls in and along a ravine that ran in front of the army. He placed the remainder of his army in the center, with his elite Spanish troops on his right. He also had several war elephants, which he now positioned in front of the Spanish.
The General Livius possessed a force of roughly the same size, in addition to Nero’s 7,000 troops. Unaware of the ravine in front of them, Nero’s men attempted to advance against the troops across from them. Hasdrubal attacked first with his elephants, trying to evoke some fear and confusion among the legion on his left flank. Nero considered his options, and deployed a part of his force around the rear of the Roman army, and hit the Spanish contingent on their flank, turning the tide of the battle. More than 20,000 Carthaginians were killed, including Hasdrubal himself. The Gauls fled, and Livius instructed his men not to pursue, knowing that the Gauls would tell others what had happened. Nero had Hasdrubal’s head catapulted into Hannibal’s camp, pointedly reporting the defeat of his army. Hannibal knew at this point that much of his support in Italy would vanish now as the prospects of his planned advance on Rome were now a serious long-shot.
The Last Push- Ilipa
The last great batle of the Second Punic War was fought at Ilipa in 206 B.C. After recruiting and training new troops during the winter, the Carthaginians now had roughly 50-60,000 infantry 5,000 horsemen, and 30 war elephants. They marched east from Gades (modern CÃƒÂ¡diz, Spain) to meet the Roman general Scipio, who had also spent much of the previous winter preparing his troops, instituting new organization reforms among his ranks and conducting rigorous training. With the help of some newly allied Celt-Iberian tribal chiefs, Scipio had a force of 45,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, more than half of which were non-Roman allies and conscripts. Scipio was an intelligent general; knowing his force was irregular and outnumbered, he designed and executed an elaborate deception plan over three days in order to give himself the best chance at success.
Scipio placed his battle camp among some small hills, directly opposite the Carthaginian camp, also deployed along a low series of hills. Scipio’s orientation was such that his force cut off the Carthaginians from their home base at Gades. As the Carthaginians attempted several calvary attacks along the Roman flanks, Scipio met them with cavalry of his own, always careful to keep his horses hidden until the last possible surprise moment. For the next 2 days the Carthaginians deployed their ranks out into the open at a late hour of the day, whereupon Scipio deployed an exact opposing formation. Neither side attacked, and both sides assumed that the next day would offer the same formations as the last, at the same late hour of the day. Scipio saw a possible advantage, and ordered his men fed and armed before daylight of the third day, and attacked the Carthaginian camp before dawn. The Carthaginians, as in the first engagement of the war, rushed onto the plain in some confusion, without breakfast or sufficient water, and deployed in the same exact manner as the day before. Scipio had successfully altered his own troop deployments, deploying his Spanish allies in the center and his Roman legions on the left and right flanks. Over the next several hours both armies advanced and retreated several times, and Scipio waited until late in the day for his real move, when the Carthaginians would truly be at a disadvantage from hunger and thirst.
In a series of flanking and wheeling maneuvers, Scipio slowly advanced the bulk of his army, engaging the Carthaginian units, as his cavalry units moved around to the rear of the Carthaginian army unchallenged. The war elephants, stationed on the wings of the Carthaginian army, panicked at the ensuing rush of horses, and began to turn and charge directly into the lines of the infantry. Hungry, exhausted, and outmaneuvered, the Carthaginians fled. Even a brief rainstorm could not save the Carthaginians from complete slaughter, as Scipio pursued the retreating lines, which were now cut off from their camp and Gades as well. The Carthaginian army was completely destroyed. Historians consider Ilipa to be a primary example of Roman military tactical skill, and Scipio is frequently mentioned as one of the greatest Roman generals in the history of the Empire as a result of the tactics he employed.
The Conquest of Iberia
But Spain still remained to be completely conquered, and amid rumors of a serious illness, Scipio’s Spanish allied troops mutinied, primarily because of lack of pay and promised spoils of war during the previous four years of campaigning against the Carthaginians. At any rate, Scipio recovered and put down the revolt, putting the leaders of the mutiny to death and placed on public display. He also followed through and provided back-pay to all of his troops, and shortly thereafter won a crushing victory over the Carthaginian-allied Celtiberean army. In 206 Scipio succeeded in capturing Gades (Cadiz), thereby ending Carthaginian control over Spain. This was an important strategic victory for the Romans as Hannibal, who was still in Italy, could no longer count on any further reinforcements from Spain.
Scipio invaded northern Africa in 204 B.C., and advanced on Carthage itself, but not before subjugating the Numidians, Carthage’s principal ally on the coast. Peace talks ensued, and Carthage formally surrendered the following year in 203 B.C. But this surrender coincided with clandestine messages to Hannibal, who was recalled to defend the city itself from an expected attack by a Roman army bent on seeking revenge. The problem was that Hannibal had to find a way to get his 20,000 men to Africa without Roman detection. This was no easy feat as the Romans now held complete dominion over the Mediterranean, and the logistical challenges of moving more than 20,000 troops across the open ocean. To his credit, Hannibal pulled it off, and with new recruits, assembled a combined force of more than 35,000 men at Hadrumetum in modern Tunisia.
Carthage’s fears were somewhat allayed in the winter of 204 B.C. when Scipio brought forth terms defined by an armistice, under which Scipio had also issued terms of Carthage’s complete surrender. As these terms were being considered in Carthage, Hannibal violated the armistice by attacking a Roman supply train. Scipio called off the peace discussions, renewing hostilities once again. But this struggle was short-lived, and the Carthaginians surrendered again in 201 B.C. following the Battle of Zama.
Surrender, Exile, and Suicide
Again terms of surrender were drawn up, and not surprisingly, the Carthaginians fared worse under the new conditions. These new terms included clauses to the effect that the Carthaginians could not make war without Roman consent, and Carthage would pay a large Roman tribute in 50 annual installments. Carthage in return could live under their own laws.
Hannibal had spent nearly two decades fighting the Romans in Italy and northern Africa. Not surprisingly, Hannibal did not settle quietly into retirement; rather many histories suggest that he led many attempts to incited the Carthaginian leadership to revolt again. At any rate, h e fled Carthage for Ephesus in Asia in 195 B.C. to the court of Antiochus who was preparing for war with Rome himself. Scipio, recently granted the title Africanus or “leader of Africa”, also traveled to Ephesus to dissuade hostilities. Reportedly the two great generals met on numerous occasions, to the extent that Antiochus apparently began to grow distrustful of Hannibal, and he eventually fell out of favor with him. When Antiochus moved against Rome, Antiochus sent Hannibal to command a fleet for the Ephesians, and he was defeated by a Roman fleet at Pamphylia. Antiochus himself was crushed by none other than Scipio near modern Manisa in 190 by Scipio.
Once more, Hannibal was on the run. He abandoned his command following the naval defeat, and fled further into Asia to the kingdom of Prusias of Bithynia , who was in the middle of a war with one of Rome’s territorial allies, Eumenes of Pergamum. Here he fought with Prusias; one legend has it that in one naval battle he drew up alongside his opposing ship, and his men throw a large number of venomous snakes onto the deck of the enemy ship.
The Romans finally hunted Hannibal down in 182 B.C. somewhere in modern Turkey. Rather than be taken alive, Hannibal poisoned himself; coincidentally, Scipio also died about this time. Plutarch records that Hannibal, taking the cup of poison in his hand, said “Let us ease the Romans of their continual dread and care, who think it long and tedious to await the death of a hated old man.”
 Polybius of Megalopolis was born at the time of the Second Punic War. As a young man Polybius crossed the Alps to try and determine how Hannibal had invaded Italy, and sailed along the coast of western Africa. His World History is important and especially insightful in terms of a study of Hannibal, but sadly much of it has been lost.
 Harold Lamb’s Hanibal, One Man Against Rome, is an excellent source on the life of Hannibal.
March 28th, 2007